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Abstract 
The framework proposed by Ofgem, OFT and CMA invokes a well-functioning 
market, but the Competition Commission has not always used such a concept, and 
when it has done so it has been problematic. Here, the well-functioning market is 
Ofgem’s vision of a successful market, not anchored in any actual market. Ofgem’s 
indicators of a competitive market have changed since 2002: tariff variety and 
products tailored to different customer groups are now a harmful complexity rather 
than a potential benefit of competition. The proposed “theories of harm” ignore 
regulatory policy and coordinated conduct facilitated by regulation. The analysis of 
weak customer response fails to distinguish between competition as an equilibrium 
state and as the Competition Commission's rivalrous discovery process over time. 
The framework thus reflects Ofgem’s perspective, but the assessment needs to be 
independent  because  regulation  is  at  issue,  and  because  Ofgem  is  no  longer 
capable of a competition assessment. 
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Ofgem, OFT and CMA are presently carrying out “an assessment of how well competition 
in the markets for gas and electricity is serving the interests of households and small firms 
in Great Britain”.1 They intend to publish a first assessment by the end of March 2014. The 
outcome of Ofgem’s consumer research will follow in late spring. Ofgem, OFT and CMA 
will then each consider their next steps. All options remain open, including a market 
investigation reference to the CMA. 
 
The three organisations have jointly set out a competition assessment framework.2 It is said 
to follow a standard typology, based on Competition Commission (CC) Guidelines. 
 
3.2 The framework consists of three stages: 
A description of a well-functioning market, and how competition should work to deliver 
desired outcomes; 
 
An explanation of the broad categories of reasons why the competitive process may not be 
working as it should (potential ‘sources of harm’); and 
 
An explanation of how we will use data and information (‘indicators’) to identify features 
of the market and analyse, investigate and conclude on how these features affect the 
process of competition and outcomes for consumers, including vulnerable consumers. 
 
The concepts of “a well-functioning market”, “sources of harm” and “indicators” are 
relatively new in the context of energy markets. The purpose of the present paper is to 
examine how the CC Guidelines and market investigations introduce these concepts, and 
how the framework proposes to interpret them. The paper identifies some concerns about 
these proposed interpretations. Since the framework is a joint project with OFT and CMA, 
the concerns apply not only if the competition assessment is an annual report by Ofgem but 
also – and perhaps especially - if it is the basis for a formal market investigation by CMA. 
 
1.   The well-functioning market in the CC Guidelines 
 
The concept of a well-functioning market was not mentioned in the CC’s 2003 Guidelines3 
that were published shortly after the Enterprise Act 2002 provided for market investigation 
references. It seems to have been first used by the CC in a couple of market investigation 
reports  published  in  2006.  It  is  mentioned,  but  generally briefly,  in  most  but  not  all 
 
 
 
 
• Emeritus Professor, University of Birmingham, and Fellow, Judge Business School, University of 
Cambridge. I have benefitted from discussions with colleagues including Eileen Marshall, Steve Smith, 
Catherine Waddams and George Yarrow, and comments from a referee, but none of these is responsible for 
what is written herein. 
1 Ofgem, OFT and CMA, Letter to Secretary of State for Energy, 5 November 2013. 
2 Ofgem, OFT and CMA, State of the market report – Assessment framework, 19 December 2013. 
3 CC3, Market Investigation References: Competition Commission Guidelines, June 2003. 
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subsequent reports. It is formally discussed in the CC’s 2013 Guidelines4.  There, it is 
defined in the context of an adverse effect on competition (AEC). The first relevant 
paragraph reads 
 
30. The Act does not specify a theoretical benchmark against which to measure an AEC. In 
its market investigation reports the CC uses the term ‘a well-functioning market’ in the 
sense, generally, of a market without the features causing the AEC, rather than to denote an 
idealized, perfectly competitive market.” 
 
Later, the Guidelines say 
 
320. In identifying some features or combination of features of the market that may give 
rise to an AEC, the CC has to find a benchmark against which to determine how the market 
may be judged to be performing. In the absence of a statutory benchmark, the CC defines 
such a benchmark as ‘a well-functioning market’ (see paragraph 30) —ie one that displays 
the beneficial aspects of competition as set out in paragraphs 10 to 12 but not an idealized 
perfectly competitive market.5 The benchmark will generally be the market envisioned 
without the features. But there may sometimes be reasons to depart from that general 
concept … 
 
Already there are three problems. First, the wording “uses” and “defines” suggests that this 
is something the CC always does. This is not the case. The term well-functioning market 
was not used in the first two market investigations, nor in a recent case that reported before 
the revised Guidelines were published (Movies on PayTV, Report 2 August 2012). Nor is 
it  mentioned  in  a  subsequent  case  (Private  Health  Services,  Provisional  Findings  2 
September 2013). 
 
Second, the two paragraphs give two slightly different definitions: in para 30 it is “a 
market without the features causing the AEC” whereas in para 320 it is “one that displays 
the beneficial aspects of competition as set out in paragraphs 10 to 12” (italics added). The 
latter are the three paragraphs beginning “10. Competition is a process of rivalry as firms 
seek to win customers’ business.” Whether a market without the AEC necessarily exhibits 
all and only the characteristics described in paragraphs 10 to 12 is an intriguing question. 
But does the second definition mean that competition has only beneficial aspects? Or that 
only its beneficial aspects are to be considered as part of the well-functioning market? If 
competition tends to drive prices towards costs, so that prices fall for customers that are 
lower cost to serve and rise for customers that are higher cost to serve, does that mean that 
the latter tendency is inconsistent with a well-functioning market?6 
 
 
 
 
 
4  CC3 Revised, Guidelines for Market Investigations: Their role, procedures, assessment and remedies, 
April 2013. 
5  CC footnote: “See, for example, the CC report on the PPI market investigation. Referring to this in its 
judgment in  Barclays Bank v  CC (October 2009) the  CAT  wrote (para104): On a  fair  reading, the 
Commission concluded  that  a  well-functioning market  for  PPI  (ie  a  market  without  the  AEC)  was 
consistent with the continuation of some incumbency or POSA being enjoyed by distributors and 
intermediaries. There is, in our view, a clear distinction between a properly functioning market unaffected 
by an AEC and an ideal market, in which every potential supplier of the relevant product competes on a 
precisely level playing field.’” 
6   A  referee  points  out  that  a  similar  issue  arises  with  the  statutory duty of  the  CMA  “to  promote 
competition … for the benefit of consumers”. What if competition does not benefit consumers, or particular 
subsets of them? 
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Third, although it seems clear that a well-functioning market is not an idealised perfectly 
competitive market, it is the market without the features that give rise to the AEC … 
except when it isn’t. So we have to look more closely at the CC’s 14 market investigation 
reports to date to discover how the term is actually used in practice. 
 
2.   The well-functioning market in CC market investigation reports 
 
It turns out that, even where term “well-functioning” appears, in most cases the CC market 
investigations use it in a perfunctory way. The benchmark is indeed often said to be the 
market without the features giving rise to the AEC. But mostly the reports find little or no 
need to use the term: generally it appears only about two or three times - not more than half 
a dozen times - in reports that are hundreds of pages long. More common wordings are 
“prices are higher than would be the case if these features did not exist” or “prices are 
higher than would be expected in a competitive market”, or simply “relatively high levels 
of prices”. 
 
In those few cases where the CC group put special emphasis on the term, it got into 
difficulties. Thus in Store Cards (Report 30 November 2006) it explained that “Even in 
some reasonably well-functioning markets, some prices will exceed efficient costs, often 
by quite a large margin and for some time.” (7.38) But the report was unable to pin down 
further what prices would be like in the well-functioning market. One is left with the 
impression “we are not sure what prices would obtain in a well-functioning market, but we 
are confident that they would be materially less than the ones that we have observed”. 
 
The ROSCOs case (Report 7 April 2009) provided the most explicit justification for 
constructing a well-functioning market. 
 
8.4 … The reason for explicitly identifying a hypothetical well-functioning market was 
because  it  was  not obvious  what a  competitive  market  would  look like,  for  example 
because of the high level of public financial support and regulation in the rail industry. 
 
As usual, the report explained that the well-functioning market was “not necessarily one 
where there is perfect competition” – implying that in principle it just might be one where 
there is perfect competition – then elaborated that it was 
 
a market where competition is as effective as possible having regard to the nature of the 
product and the circumstances in which it is supplied. It is a hypothetical comparator and is 
not necessarily a market that could be created in practice. 
 
The last phrase could have been expected to be problematic, and was. What is a market 
“where competition is as effective as possible”, but “not necessarily a market that could be 
created in practice”? The group “used our judgement to decide to what extent the well- 
functioning market in this case should reflect aspects of the actual market.” (para 4.28) It 
set out its assumptions over several paragraphs, concluding that “This process of 
competition would result in a market equilibrium …” (para 4.30) 
 
The group then ran into difficulty. One member disagreed with the majority’s 
characterisation of the well-functioning market, and argued that it should include a market 
for used as well as new rolling stock. On this basis he argued for an additional cost-based 
price cap that the majority rejected. The rather surreal nature of both conceptions of the 
well-functioning market was reflected in the acknowledgement that 
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“in practice there is no possibility of entry or expansion in the market for used stock in 
Great  Britain.  …  However  as  our  report  states,  the  well-functioning  market  is  a 
hypothetical  comparator,  one  where  competition  would  be  deemed  to  be  working 
effectively if circumstances were different, and it is not a necessary requirement in 
identifying this comparator that changing those circumstances should be practicable.” 
(Dissenting opinion para 4). 
 
There is another difficulty with the group’s definition. There are surely two main reasons 
why the CC has explicitly not taken a well-functioning market to be characterised by 
perfect   competition.   The   first   is   that   the   assumptions   of   perfect   competition   – 
homogeneous  product,  many  buyers  and  sellers,  perfect  information  etc  –  are  too 
restrictive. In practice, in many markets less restrictive assumptions are “good enough” to 
get the benefits of competition. 
 
The second reason for rejecting perfect competition is that it assumes a market in 
equilibrium whereas the CC knows full well that real markets are always in a state of 
change. A well-functioning market in equilibrium is therefore one that, by definition, does 
not display the “beneficial aspects of competition set out in paragraphs 10 to 12” of the 
Guidelines. Consider the opening description given there. 
 
10. Competition is a process of rivalry as firms seek to win customers’ business. It creates 
incentives for firms to meet the existing and future needs of customers as effectively and 
efficiently as possible - by cutting prices, increasing output, improving quality or variety, 
or introducing new and better products, often through innovation”.(italics added) 
 
The Guidelines explicitly depict competition as a process of rivalry taking place over time 
(a depiction that is even more explicit in the 2003 Guidelines paras 1.16-1.18). As the 
italicised words indicate, the CC Guidelines see competition as a process of change, 
explicitly not as a state of equilibrium.7 
 
Finally and most recently, in Audit Services (Report 15 October 2013), the group defined 
the well-functioning market as the market without the features causing the AEC. Indeed, 
“we do not consider there to be a realistic alternative comparator for the relevant market”. 
(para 7.1) But one party asked how the group could define a market without the features 
causing an AEC if those features were intrinsic to the market – in this case “audit is in part 
an experience good, the scope of which changes after appointment”, so how could the 
group also identify that very feature as an AEC? 
 
 
 
7 Key contributions to the concept of competition as a rivalrous process over time include JA Schumpeter, 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper & Row,, 3rd edn, 1950) especially chapter VII “The process 
of creative destruction”; FA Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, American Economic Review 
XXXV (4), 1945, 519-30, reprinted in Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1948); FA Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure” in FA Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, 
Politics,  Economics  and  the  History  of  Ideas  (University  of  Chicago  Press,  1978);    IM  Kirzner, 
Competition and Entrepreneurship (Chicago University Press, 1973); IM Kirzner, “The Perils of 
Regulation: A Market Process Approach” in IM Kirzner, Discovery and the Capitalist Process (Chicago 
University Press, 1985); IM Kirzner, “Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An 
Austrian Approach”, Journal of Economic Literature, 35(1), 1997, 60-85. Another recent and accessible 
succinct exposition is in IM Kirzner, “How Markets Work: Disequilibrium, Entrepreneurship and 
Discovery”, Institute of Economic Affairs, Hobart Paper No 133, June 1997, available at www.iea.org.uk 
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In contrast, an earlier case had no difficulty in dealing with an intrinsic feature of the 
market, and it is probably relevant that a well-functioning market was not invoked. BAA 
Airports (Report 19 March 2009) “concluded that Aberdeen had the characteristics of a 
natural monopoly, deriving from its comparatively isolated geographical location”. (para 
10.198) The report then found that “Aberdeen’s local market power was reflected in 
relatively high levels of prices and profitability and relatively low levels of investment.” 
(para 10.200) It would be difficult to find a more intrinsic feature of a market than an 
airport’s geographical location. But the group were able succinctly to identify, assess and 
remedy the consequences of this feature without reference to the concept of a well- 
functioning market. The Guidelines subsequently cited this approach as an example of non- 
price indicators.8 
 
Thus, the concept of a “well-functioning market” is both unnecessary and has proved 
problematic in practice. Having made the point that the benchmark is not an idealised 
perfectly competitive market, a CC market investigation reference could simply replace the 
term “well-functioning market” by a phrase such as “competitive market” or “market 
without the features giving rise to the AEC”. That would be simpler and would not raise 
problematic questions about what the hypothetical well-functioning market really is. 
 
3.   The well-functioning market in the competition assessment framework 
 
The framework notes that, following the assessment at the end of March 2014, Ofgem, 
OFT and CMA will separately consider next steps. These include proposing a market 
investigation reference. Suppose the retail energy market were indeed referred for a market 
investigation. What would be the appropriate benchmark against which to assess an AEC? 
And what if any role would or should the well-functioning market play? 
 
I have argued above that the concept of a well-functioning market is both unnecessary and 
problematic, and in practice not always used. It would be entirely possible to examine the 
retail energy market and make comparisons against “a competitive market” or against the 
retail energy market in the absence of any identified AEC, or simply to observe that prices 
or profits or any other indicator are relatively high or low, compared for example to 
previous or other markets or markets in other countries. One previous CC report invoked 
the concept of a well-functioning market because it was not obvious what a competitive 
market would look like. That is not a relevant consideration here: the GB retail energy 
market has been open to competition for over a decade. Thus, there seems no case for the 
CC  to  define its  own  counterfactual  well-functioning retail  energy market,  and  every 
reason to take a simpler, less problematic approach. 
 
However, this is not how the present competition assessment framework sees the situation. 
It makes no mention of the para 30 definition (the market without the features causing the 
AEC). It goes straight to the para 320 definition, invoking the beneficial aspects of 
competition, and seizes the opportunity to insert its own priorities. 
 
3.4. The framework, like other competition assessments, uses the concept of a hypothetical 
well-functioning energy market. This well-functioning market acts as a comparator against 
which we can assess the effects on competition of identified features of the market. It is not 
 
 
8  “In its investigation into BAA airports, the CC compared Aberdeen Airport with other regional airports 
and found slower development of routes; lack of ambition in development; underinvestment and poor 
facilities.” (Guidelines para 129) 
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an  idealised  or  perfectly  competitive  market,  but  one  that  allows  the  benefits  of 
competition to occur. In describing this well-functioning market, we recognise that energy 
is an essential service and that there are certain groups of consumers who are not able to 
engage in the market as much as others. (italics added) 
 
What is the significance of the added sentence? That a competitive or well-functioning 
market is to defined differently, or to be judged by different standards, if it concerns “an 
essential service” or if certain groups of consumers are “unable to engage” as much as 
others? 
 
The framework next cites the beneficial aspects of competition set out in para 10 of the 
CC’s Guidelines, then launches into a more detailed “look at some of the characteristics we 
would expect to see in a well-functioning energy market in the short and longer term”. 
(para 3.6) 
 
3.8. In the short term, we consider that a well-functioning energy market would be 
characterised by consumers being engaged and empowered to secure good outcomes when 
they participate in the market. For example, they should receive good service and clear, 
understandable communications. We would also expect to see pressure on suppliers’ costs 
and margins. 
… 
3.10. In the longer term, we would expect the outcomes described in the section above to 
persist. In addition, a well-functioning market would be characterised by further changes in 
suppliers’ behaviour, leading to a more dynamic, innovative market. In such a market we 
would expect to see suppliers and new entrants (some using new commercial models) 
reacting to changes in the market to offer consumers new products and services. 
 
Thus, the competition assessment framework has rejected the approach to the well- 
functioning market that has been adopted in almost all of the CC market investigations to 
date. Instead of defining a well-functioning market grounded in the actual market, the 
framework  has  adopted  the  do-it-yourself  approach  used  in  the  three  exceptional  CC 
market investigations. One of these left the definition of the well-functioning market 
obscure, one led to a subjective and disputed reconstruction of what might constitute a 
well-functioning market, with a split in the group as to remedies, and one was criticised for 
the use of mutually-inconsistent assumptions. 
 
Opening the investigation to a subjective definition of a well-functioning market is 
tantamount to opening Pandora’s Box. Since OFT and CMA are not yet expert in retail 
energy markets, the background to the framework description is presumably “Ofgem’s 
vision” described in the Executive Summary to the document. 
 
Ofgem’s vision of a successful energy market is one where suppliers, including a range of 
new entrants, compete over time to make better offers to consumers and that empowered 
and  engaged  consumers  incentivise  suppliers  to  compete  with  each  other  to  deliver 
efficient and innovative products and services. In this market, there would be high levels of 
customer service, significant switching in response to price changes, and different supplier 
strategies around pricing and customer acquisition. There would be competitive pressure 
constraining the level of prices and profits and driving suppliers to reduce their costs. 
Ofgem’s view would also recognise that energy is an essential service, and that certain 
groups of consumers that are not able to engage in the market fully are not unduly 
disadvantaged. 
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This is looking less like a description of how a competitive retail energy market would 
actually operate and more like a description of what it would be nice to have. It is, literally, 
a  “vision”  of  a  competitive  market,  that  would  exhibit  “new  entrants  …  innovative 
products … high levels of customer service, significant switching” etc. The vision is not 
anchored in any concept of what levels of new entry, innovation, customer service and 
switching it is realistic to expect a competitive market to provide. Obvious comparators are 
the UK retail energy market in previous years, energy markets in other countries with and 
without  retail  competition,  markets  for  other  utility  products,  and  markets  for  other 
products and services generally. None of these real markets is mentioned: the benchmark is 
simply a vision. 
 
Like the opening reference in the framework, to “how competition should work to deliver 
desired outcomes” (para 3.2), this is an instrumentalist view of competition. It is not based 
on an understanding of how markets actually work. It is a description of how a regulatory 
body, subject to statutory duties and political pressures, would find it convenient for a 
competitive market to work, in order to “deliver desired outcomes”. 
 
4.   Indicators of a well-functioning energy market 
 
The framework proposes to “use data and information (‘indicators’) to identify features of 
the market”. I focus here on one aspect of this. The CC Guidelines refer to “incentives for 
firms to meet the … needs of customers … by improving quality or variety, or introducing 
new and better products”. (para 10). In discussing non-price indicators it says: 
 
127. … Poor quality, lack of innovation, or limited product ranges are prominent among 
other indicators of weak competition in a market. 
128. … In its investigation into PPI, the CC considered evidence it had obtained so as ‘to 
identify: any new PPI policies which had been introduced, whether there had been any 
innovations within existing policies, the rationale for product change or innovation, and 
whether, and if so how, distributors advertised and marketed their policies’. 
 
One would therefore expect to see, inter alia, indicators seeking to measure the extent to 
which the market had been characterised by innovation and increasing product ranges, the 
introduction  of  different  services  or  discounts  geared  to  the  needs  and  situations  of 
different types of customers, and so on. 
 
This is in fact what Ofgem found when it reviewed gas and electricity competition back in 
2001.9 
 
6.1 The existence of a range of offers would tend to suggest that customers are able to 
benefit  from  the  operation  of  the  competitive  market.  Competitive  pressures, 
responsiveness to demand, and innovation may also be indicated by the existence and 
range of non-price offers. … 
6.17 The range of tariffs and offers available to customers has continued to widen and 
become more innovative. Certain offers have been in existence for several years, such as 
green tariffs, energy efficiency deals, offers targeted at disadvantaged customers, 
complementary products such as dual fuel tariffs, affinity deals and online services. Such 
established offers have been taken up by more suppliers and have become more responsive 
to customer demands. 
 
 
9 Ofgem, Review of domestic gas and electricity competition and supply price regulation: Evidence and 
Initial Proposals, November 2001. 
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6.18 In addition to these developments new innovations have emerged including loyalty 
cards, offers aimed at students, and no standing charge offers in electricity supply. Also 
some switchers who have not made a saving since switching can benefit from double the 
difference  offers.  Some  of  these  recent  developments  are  discussed  in  more  detail 
below….. 
 
Surprisingly, the framework document does not mention these characteristics. The Sector 
Overview chapter therein concentrates instead on the things that Ofgem has found wrong 
with the market since 2008. The framework sets out the proposed characteristics of a 
successful energy market, and the associated suggested indicators to assess the functioning 
of the market in these respects (paras 3.9, 3.13, Figs 2,3). They include heavy emphasis on 
high customer engagement, good service and clear communications, reflecting Ofgem’s 
recent policy concerns. Innovative tariffs are mentioned as an indicator of a well- 
functioning market in the longer term. But there is no mention under longer term or short 
term outcomes of indicators such as the range of products and special offers. 
 
Why is this, and why is Ofgem’s approach now so different from what it used to be? 
Perhaps because the beneficial aspects of competition – such as the many discounts for 
direct debit, prompt payment, online accounts, dual fuel etc - have now been reinterpreted? 
At best they are taken for granted. At worst they are regarded as harmful complexities that 
serve mainly to befuddle customers and discourage them from engaging in the market. The 
aim of Ofgem’s policy has therefore changed. Its recent aim – and the effect of its policy - 
has been to suppress tariff variety and to prevent firms from tailoring their products to the 
different needs of different customers. Such features are no longer to be identified as 
potential beneficial aspects of the competitive market process. 
 
5.   Theories of harm: Hamlet without the Prince 
 
The Guidelines introduce the concept of “theories of harm”. 
 
163. To provide focus and structure to its assessment of the way competition is working in 
a market the CC sets out one or more ‘theories of harm’. A theory of harm is a hypothesis 
of how harmful competitive effects might arise in a market and adversely affect customers. 
 
The Guidelines identify (para 170) five main sources of harm: unilateral market power 
(including market concentration), barriers to entry and expansion, coordinated conduct, 
vertical relationships, and weak customer response. 
 
A market investigation of the retail energy sector would no doubt wish to consider all 
these. I do not discuss further unilateral market power and concentration, barriers to entry 
and  expansion,  and  vertical  relationships.  I  comment  briefly  below  on  co-ordinated 
conduct and weak customer response. But an even more important source of harm is 
noticeable by its absence from the framework. 
 
The Guidelines do not list regulation or regulatory requirements as potential main sources 
of harm. However, the Guidelines are clear that “Individual theories of harm are numerous 
and specific to different market investigations. …The list is not exhaustive. While the 
majority of theories of harm flow from these five sources, other theories may be identified 
that do not do so.” (paras 170, 171) The Guidelines say explicitly that regulatory 
requirements are structural features that may constitute a potential source of harm, and 
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indeed have been found as such in previous market investigations.10 There is a whole sub- 
section (paras 223-26) on regulatory barriers to entry. 
 
In deliberating whether to introduce its non-discrimination condition SLC 25A in 2009, 
Ofgem itself explicitly recognised the real possibility that this could adversely affect 
competition. 11  There is now increasing evidence that Ofgem’s regulatory policy, via its 
implementation of SLC 25A, has indeed severely restricted and distorted competition in 
the retail energy sector.12  Several indicators of competition, such as customer switching 
rates and variety of products, have shown a downturn since the implementation of these 
policies, and there is no obvious other explanatory factor. Since then, Ofgem (supported by 
DECC) has implemented its radical tariff simplification policy, which has had an adverse 
effect on competition directly rather than indirectly - amongst other things restricting each 
supplier to at most four different tariffs.13 
 
It is therefore surprising and disconcerting to find that the competition assessment 
framework makes almost no reference to regulatory policy as a possible source of harm 
giving rise to an AEC.14 This is Hamlet without the Prince. 
 
The benchmark against which regulation as a source of harm could be measured is 
straightforward,  and  would  require  no  sophisticated  definition  of  a  well-functioning 
market. The effect of SLC 25A could be assessed against the actual market until the actual 
market as it developed until 2008, and the effect of tariff simplification could be assessed 
against the actual market as it developed until 2013. 
 
6.   Theories of harm: coordinated conduct 
 
The framework says that “Our five potential sources of harm are based on those set out in 
the CC’s standard guidelines for market investigations” (para 4.1). Yet the framework 
omits “coordinated conduct” as a potential source of harm. Instead it substitutes “weak 
competition between suppliers”. 
 
It is true that the framework then mentions co-ordinated conduct as a possible source of 
weak competition between suppliers. But why change the basis proposed by the CC? 
Perhaps because the policies introduced by Ofgem are a clear example of the conditions 
 
 
 
10 “Specific structural features identified in past investigations to be harming competition include aspects of 
the planning system, government policy and the regulatory system (in the BAA airports investigation and, 
with regard to the planning regime, in the grocery retailing market); the criteria applied for the award of 
franchises (in the ROSCOs market investigation);” (Guidelines para 157) 
11  “5.70 We recognise that there are risks to the intensity of competitive activity between suppliers as a 
result of this measure. The impact on competition is ambiguous and made particularly uncertain by the 
specific characteristics of the energy supply market. … We recognise that some forms of price 
discrimination have in the past helped competition to develop in the domestic energy supply market.” 
Ofgem, Addressing Undue Discrimination – final impact assessment, ref 73/09, 26 June 2009. 
12  M Hviid and C Waddams Price, “Non-discrimination Clauses in the Retail Energy Sector”(2012) 122 
Economic Journal 236. Stephen Littlechild, “Ofgem’s Retail Choice: A Response to Ofgem’s Consultation 
on SLC 25A”, 28 May 2012. Catherine Waddams Price and Minyan Zhu, “Prices and consumer switching 
in the British Retail Electricity Market”, Centre for Competition Policy, Working Paper 13-12, 2013. 
13 See Stephen Littlechild, “Protecting Customers or Suppliers? A response to Ofgem's Consultation on its 
Retail Market Review – Updated Domestic Proposals”, 21 December 2012. 
14  Para 14 makes cursory mention of “the impact of regulation” as one of half a dozen aspects that the 
assessment will investigate in order to assess weak competition between suppliers. 
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conducive  to  co-ordinated  conduct  as  set  out  in  the  Guidelines?  For  example,  the 
Guidelines say 
 
252 (b) Simple and relatively undifferentiated products are more easily subject to 
the coordinated setting of prices than situations in which each firm’s offering is 
different from the offerings of its rivals…. 
259. Less obvious means and practices may also increase the transparency or 
predictability of the environment in which firms operate. These may include the 
adoption  of  rules  of  conduct,  ethics  codes,  product standardization,  regulatory 
disclosures, …price computation manuals. Such practices may sometimes be 
justifiable on efficiency or customer-benefit grounds, but they could also create 
market conditions favourable for coordination. 
 
Ofgem’s tariff simplification policy has focused on limiting differentiation of products and 
imposing rules of conduct, product standardisation, price computation metrics and so on. 
Indeed, Ofgem’s policies have addressed all the major challenges facing a group of energy 
retailers that might wish to coordinate their activities to reduce competitive pressure.15 
 
7.   Theories of harm: weak customer response 
 
The fifth potential source of harm listed by the Guidelines is “weak customer response”. 
The discussion of this topic is much more extensive than in the 2003 Guidelines. The 2013 
Guidelines have no less than five pages outlining all the ways in which weak customer 
response might manifest itself. At its most succinct, the message of the Guidelines is: 
 
ways  in  which  competition  might  be  threatened  include:  …  customers  may  lack 
information about what product to choose, may not be able to judge between different 
products on offer (para 15). 
 
To drive effective competition customers need to be both willing and able to: access 
information about the various offers available in the market; assess these offers to identify 
the good or service that provides the best value for them; and act on this assessment by 
switching to purchasing the good or service from their preferred supplier. (para 296) 
 
The Guidelines explore ways in which weak customer response presents barriers to 
accessing information, identifying best value offers and switching suppliers. This includes 
discussion of “behavioural bias”. 
 
The Introduction to the Guidelines says that “Since the inception of the regime the CC has 
learnt  much  from  its  practical  experience  of  conducting  cases,  and  has  progressively 
refined its policies, practices and procedures. These Guidelines distil the lessons the CC 
has absorbed ...” (para 1). Unfortunately, only the last paragraph of the five pages on weak 
customer  response  gives  references  to  how  the  CC  has  actually  dealt  with  this 
phenomenon, and even that paragraph is limited to how the CC has identified causes of 
switching costs. 
 
The Guidelines tend to see engaged consumers as a prerequisite for a well-functioning 
market, so that effective competition is only possible once consumers are engaged. This is 
 
 
15  Littlechild, supra n 12, especially Appendix 1 on coordinated effects. Stephen Littlechild, “Simple 
Tariffs or Simply Anti-competitive? Ofgem's Retail Market Review and Associated Developments”, 
Beesley Lecture, London, 17 October 2013. 
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an unduly restricted view of competition. Rather, competition should be seen as including 
the process for getting consumers engaged in the market. Because they neglect this latter 
aspect, the Guidelines are in danger of interpreting firms’ actions in a one-sided way, as 
tactics that simply increase complexity and discourage engagement. This overlooks the fact 
that the aim and effect of these actions may well be to attract customers by increasing 
engagement. 
 
To illustrate this argument, consider by analogy the impact of transport and switching 
costs. Any sensible concept of competition does not require that transport and switching 
costs be zero: that is not necessarily realistic in all or indeed any markets. It would reflect 
what the Guidelines rightly dismiss as “an idealized, perfectly competitive market”. 
 
Rather, in assessing the nature of competition in any actual market, one might ask two 
questions. First, is the competitive process effective given the extent of such costs - for 
example, does it tend to identify and reduce price differentials that exceed transport and 
switching costs? Second, does the competitive process seek and find ways of reducing 
those very transport and switching costs? 
 
Similarly, competition does not require that all or most customers be fully engaged: to the 
extent that “behavioural bias” is intrinsic in human nature, this may not even be possible. 
Again, full engagement would be true only in an idealized market. Rather, in assessing 
competition in any actual market, one might pose the analogous two questions. First, is the 
competitive process effective despite the limited engagement and behavioural biases of 
customers? Second, does the competitive process seek and find ways of stimulating 
customer engagement and overcoming behavioural bias? 
 
From this broader perspective on competition, tactics that might be criticised from a 
narrower perspective have additional merit. Consider for example a remark about 
advertising in the 2003 Guidelines. 
 
3.53 Advertising is often an important source of information for consumers, but can have an 
ambiguous effect on information asymmetries. Advertising and promotional offers increase the 
visibility of a product and provide information on price, where it can be bought and so on. 
However advertising may not necessarily be informative in terms of what consumers want to 
know about a product; rather it may contain only what firms feel consumers need to know in 
order to persuade more of them to buy the product. 
 
For present purposes, the telling point is the final phrase. In real-world competitive markets 
it is not enough to have a good product at a good price: in order to compete effectively, 
firms have to persuade customers to buy the product, they have to persuade customers to 
engage.16 
 
 
16 “Clearly there is a role for advertising beyond ‘providing information in response to consumer demand’. 
There is, in addition, a role for advertising to grab the attention of potential consumers and direct them both 
to  the  information and  to  the  goods  that  are  available. …  [I]n  a  world  of  complexity, change  and 
uncertainty, it is inevitable that consumers are imperfectly aware of the qualities and promise of the 
multitudes of goods. The need to alert consumers to what they do not know that they do not know, is very 
real. … From the mainstream perspective, advertising makes sense only as a weapon in the arsenal of the 
monopolist. From the perspective on advertising described here, however, advertising is plainly a tool with 
which to compete. … The producer who judges more correctly what kind of dramatic advertising message 
will best awaken consumer interest has the more successfully served those consumers.” IM Kirzner, “How 
Markets Work”, supra n 7, at p 55. 
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Just as firms have to compete by finding ways to reduce transport and switching costs, so 
they have to compete by finding ways  to stimulate customers to  “access information 
…assess these offers … and act on this assessment”. Thus, engaged customers are not a 
pre-requisite for effective competition, they are a consequence of it.17 
 
8.   Behavioural economics and the nature of competition 
 
This is not to say that, if some customers are not engaged, the market is not characterised 
by effective competition. Competition is a process taking place over time, as the 2003 
Guidelines emphasised. At any point in time this process will be characterised by learning 
and change, rather than by full knowledge and equilibrium. At any point in time some 
customers will be aware of, and will respond to, the best offers available, and some won’t. 
But this is not a final resting place characterising the market forever after. The customers 
that are not  yet aware of the best offers, or have not  yet responded to them, simply 
represent a challenge that the competitors with the best offers have not yet overcome. 
 
This brings us to what seems to be a systematic weakness underlying much of the 
behavioural economics literature. It fails to appreciate, or at least acknowledge, the 
difference between competition as a state of equilibrium and as a continuing rivalrous 
process over time. (To be more precise, the suggested weakness is not in the psychological 
and  empirical  literature  on  how  customers  actually  do  behave,  but  in  the  economic 
literature discussing the market implications of such findings.) As a result, much of the 
behavioural economics literature, and the emphasis placed on it in the Guidelines, is 
inconsistent with the nature of competition that is emphasised by the CC. 
 
For example, the Guidelines cite the literature review carried out for the OFT.18 This 
comprehensive and valuable survey comes to rather dismal conclusions. 
 
6.2 The most striking result of the literature so far is that increasing competition through 
fostering entry of more firms may not on its own always improve outcomes for consumers. 
Indeed competition may not help when there are at least some consumers who do not 
search properly or have difficulties judging quality and prices …. In the presence of such 
consumers it is no longer clear that firms necessarily have an incentive to compete by 
offering better deals. Rather, they can focus on exploiting biased consumers who are very 
likely to purchase from them regardless of price and quality. These effects can be made 
worse through firms’ deliberate attempts to make price comparisons and search harder 
(through complex pricing, shrouding, etc) and obscure product quality. The incentives to 
engage in such activities become more intense when there are more competitors. … 
6.5 We also find that firms may sometimes have little incentive to educate consumers. This 
is  particularly  severe  if  educated  or  sophisticated  consumers  benefit  from the  pricing 
offered by those firms who do not engage in consumer education …. However, where 
learning will eventually eradicate consumer biases, firms may have a clear incentive to 
establish a reputation for 'fair behaviour' early on …. 
 
 
 
17 A referee comments that there was a similar confusion in Ofgem’s discussion of its non-discrimination 
conditions, where it saw equal prices as an outcome of (long-term equilibrium in ) competitive markets, but 
at the same time thought that imposing equal prices would encourage more vigorous competition. 
18  Consumer behavioural biases in competition – A survey, A Report by Stefan Huck, Jidong Zhou and 
London Economics Charlotte Duke, OFT 1324, Office of Fair Trading, May 2011. For other surveys, see 
What does behavioural economics mean for competition policy? OFT, 2010 and What can behavioural 
economics say about GB energy consumers? Ofgem, 21 March 2011. 
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The  analyses,  results  and  policy  implications  underlying  these  conclusions  depend 
critically on the assumed nature of competition. In the models summarised by the survey, 
sophisticated customers engage and derive the benefits of a competitive market, 
unsophisticated customers do not. Competitors have an incentive to try to engage the 
unsophisticated customers, but some customers remain unengaged and will be exploited. 
 
However,  this  result  is  a  characterisation  of  a  market  in  equilibrium,  when  every 
participant has learned what it is possible for that participant to learn. By assumption, 
competition can do no more for the unengaged and exploited customers. In contrast, a 
market conceived as a rivalrous process over time would see these same customers as a 
challenge for competitors (including switching sites). From this perspective, the essence of 
competition is the search for new ways to overcome what others see as an obstacle or as 
impossible – in this case, to find a way of alerting the unengaged customers to a better 
offer. That discovery process is never-ending. The very nature of competition as a process 
is to disrupt a market in equilibrium. 
 
This point is in fact recognised (just) by what the survey calls “a modern classic” in the 
behavioural economics literature.19 That paper argues that, with unaware consumers, firms 
will charge high add-on fees and shroud (hide) rather than advertise their level. According 
to the survey 
 
3.51 The main result of the paper is that, if there are sufficiently many unaware consumers, 
firms will … systematically exploit the unawareness …. 
3.52 In this scenario biased [unaware] consumers cross-subsidise sophisticated consumers 
…. This result is robust to even very intense competition. 
 
However, the authors acknowledge that 
 
Our analysis raises the question of long-run dynamics. If consumers learn to avoid add-on 
fees, does shrouding eventually vanish along with high add-on prices? …We believe that 
fees for specific add-ons have a life cycle. When the add-on is new, it tends to be shrouded 
and priced above marginal cost. Over time, shrouding decreases, and the add-on price falls. 
Using our notation, the fraction α of myopes decreases over time, and shrouding eventually 
disappears. (pp 522-3) 
 
That  disruption  is  just  a  matter  of  time,  and  incentives.  At  any point  in  time,  some 
customers may not be engaged. As in conventional economics, the greater the profit from 
an existing supplier serving an unengaged customer, the greater is the incentive for a rival 
to discover a way to engage that customer. Similarly, the greater the saving to be made, the 
greater is the likelihood that the customer will discover it. In behavioural economics as in 
conventional economics, profit is not only an indication of a problem, it is also an inherent 
part of the solution. 
 
9.   Weak customer response in the framework document 
 
The framework, like the Guidelines, identifies weak customer response as a potential harm, 
and explores how it might manifest itself in the energy market. 
 
 
 
 
19  X Gabaix and D Laibson, “Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in 
Competitive Markets” (2006) 121(2) Quarterly Journal of Economics 505. 
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4.19 Features of the market may mean that it is unnecessarily difficult for many consumers 
to engage effectively in the market. Ofgem’s RMR found that these features may include: 
-  A  large  number  of  tariffs,  many  of  which  have  complex  structures  and  discount 
arrangements. This makes the prospect of engaging in the market unattractive for many 
consumers and means it is often difficult for consumers who do engage to choose the best 
tariff for their circumstances. … 
4.20 This in combination with other market features …could limit the ability of customers 
to find a better tariff and, in turn, limit the competitive pressure on other suppliers…. 
 
From the perspective just discussed, Ofgem’s RMR has been problematic. It has 
downplayed the extent to which retail competition has actually been effective, in contrast 
to Ofgem’s stance up until 2008. And the framework, like Ofgem’s present policy, fails to 
acknowledge that many of the practices that it condemns and prohibits as harmful to 
competition may also be seen as pro-competitive tactics seeking to stimulate customer 
engagement and overcome behavioural bias. 
 
Take for example the concerns just cited in 4.19 and 4.20 of the framework. A large 
number of sometimes complex tariffs is said to make it difficult for customers to engage. 
But many of these complex structures and discount arrangements are designed to meet the 
needs of, and attract the attention of, particular groups of customers. They are attempts to 
stimulate rather than depress engagement by these customers. Accumulating empirical 
evidence suggests that customers are more likely to engage as a result of attractive offers 
than as a result of less complex ones.20 Thus, by prohibiting the arrangements proposed by 
firms, and imposing its own more limiting arrangements, Ofgem is actually preventing 
suppliers from making offers that will attract the attention of customers. It is thereby 
restricting rather than promoting customer engagement and effective competition. 
 
Not only sector regulators and competition authorities are concerned about weak customer 
response: firms and switching sites competing in the market are concerned too. All these 
market participants face essentially the same challenge: to interest customers in their 
product and assist them to overcome the barriers to switching. Competition is a rivalrous 
process for identifying those market participants that can not only design the best products, 
but can also find the best ways to attract customers’ attention and to persuade them of the 
merits of these products to the extent that customers actually go out and buy them. In this 
way, Adam Smith’s invisible hand of competition not only protects customers that are 
well-informed and engaged. It also reaches out and draws in, to the extent that competing 
market  participants  can  best  devise,  those  customers  that  would  otherwise  be  less 
informed, less interested and less engaged. 
 
All this has implications for the assessment of an AEC and for the benchmark definition of 
a well-functioning market. Weak customer response, and limited customer engagement, no 
doubt influence the nature of competition. But there is limited usefulness, at best, in 
identifying them as an AEC. A benchmark of a well-functioning market that wishfully 
assumes a level of response and customer engagement that is arbitrarily higher and more 
satisfactory than the present level is irrelevant and misleading if there is no way to achieve 
that higher level of engagement (or not without compromising competition in other 
respects). 
 
 
 
20  M Flores and C Waddams Price, “Consumer Behaviour in the British Retail Electricity Market”, CCP 
Working Paper 13-10, October 2013. 
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In an uncertain world where relatively little is yet known about customer preferences and 
biases, the more relevant question is how best to discover how, and how far, customers can 
be motivated to engage. This in turn raises the question whether regulators and competition 
authorities looking from afar are better placed to discover and implement answers to this 
question than market participants and switching sites that actually have skin in the game.21 
 
10. Ofgem, OFT and CMA – whose framework is it anyway? 
 
The assessment of competition in the retail energy market, due for publication by the end 
of March 2014, is said to be conducted within a framework based upon CC Guidelines. 
This paper has examined some key features of those Guidelines - the nature of the well- 
functioning market, the indicators of competition and the theories of harm including the 
concept of weak customer response - and how the framework proposes to apply this in the 
case of the retail energy market. 
 
I have  suggested  that  the  CC  Guidelines  have  certain  limitations  with  respect  to  the 
concept and definition of a well-functioning market and the concept of weak customer 
response as a major source of harm. The well-functioning market is neither necessary nor 
helpful. Weak customer response is given undue prominence and does not sit well with the 
CC’s commitment to competition as a rivalrous process taking place over time. The CMA 
may wish to consider these matters as it embarks on its new life. 
 
More urgent is the framework for assessing competition in the retail energy sector. The 
framework document exploits the limitations just mentioned. Not surprisingly, perhaps, it 
is presented from an Ofgem perspective. This perspective is reflected in 
- the   definition   of   a   well-functioning   market   as   one   embodying   Ofgem’s 
instrumentalist vision of competition to “deliver desired outcomes”; 
- the absence of range of tariffs and discounts as indicators of competition, both of 
which indicators Ofgem’s policy has explicitly hampered; 
- the lack of focus on regulatory policy as a possible source of harm, despite explicit 
mention in the Guidelines of this as a possible source of harm and despite 
considerable accumulated empirical evidence that Ofgem’s policy has in fact 
restricted and distorted competition; 
- the substitution of weak supplier response for coordinated conduct as a potential 
source of harm, when Ofgem’s policy has required firms to adopt policies that the 
Guidelines suggest can be expected to facilitate coordinated conduct; 
- the characterisation, in line with Ofgem’s policy,  of tariffs with complex structures 
and discount arrangements as simply a potential harm to competition that prevents 
customers from engaging in the market, when such tariffs are also a means of 
competing by offering benefits to customers and thereby encouraging them to 
engage. 
 
 
 
 
21 A referee comments, “The focus on ‘disengaged’ consumers reflects a more general trend among 
competition authorities to identify this as a problematic feature (with a potential Adverse Effect on 
Competition?) of many markets, which seems to lead to increasingly interventionist remedies. While 
consumers certainly do not behave like classical welfare maximisers, a presumption that their failure to do 
so requires remedy is likely to lead to much greater intervention, which often seems to result in unintended 
and undesirable consequences. Because both the baseline and the appropriate change are so ill defined, this 
may also be a way for special interests, both within and outside the industry, to exert inappropriate 
influence. It is good to see this general danger raised in this particular context.” 
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This approach and presentation would be understandable if the framework were an Ofgem 
document, describing an Ofgem-only project. One might disagree with the perspective, but 
one could hope and expect that OFT and CMA would take a different and independent 
perspective. 
 
However, the framework is not solely an Ofgem document: it is a joint statement by 
Ofgem, OFT and CMA. This means that OFT and CMA are signed up to a framework that 
intimately reflects the perspective of Ofgem, when Ofgem’s retail energy policy is the 
leading candidate for a feature having an adverse effect on competition. That policy 
urgently needs to be the subject of independent review. 
. 
Under previous statutory arrangements, the CC would approach a market investigation in 
an entirely independent way. But as from 1 April 2014 the OFT and CC will be combined 
into CMA. It will be for CMA to decide how to proceed, whether to instigate a market 
investigation, and how to conduct it. How then can CMA independently evaluate the 
evidence that emerges from this investigation when it is already committed to a particular 
framework that has the limitations identified above? 
 
It might be said that Board members of a market investigation group would not be involved 
in the decision to refer a market for investigation, and that each market investigation group 
may determine its own procedure. So if the retail energy market were referred for a market 
investigation, the group would not be committed to the framework that CMA has hitherto 
proposed. It could adopt an entirely independent and uncommitted approach and take a 
fresh look at the evidence. But are the nature of the approach, and the evidence and how it 
is presented to the group, entirely independent of the staff team that prepares material for 
the group and translates its deliberations into a report? How then is the importance of 
independence to be reconciled with the latest statement from CMA? 
 
1.22 At operational (staff) level, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and to facilitate 
an efficient end-to-end markets process, the CMA would normally expect to have a degree 
of case team continuity by retaining at least some of the market study case team to work on 
the larger market investigation case team when a matter is referred. [A footnote adds:] In 
the case of a market investigation referred to the CMA by a regulator, some of the market 
study  case  team  may  be  seconded  to  the  CMA  to  be  part  of  the  relevant  market 
investigation case team.22 
 
How can a market study case team seconded from Ofgem expect to forget the framework 
that it has hitherto developed and approach a CMA market investigation with an open 
mind? In the event that the investigation yields a CMA report critical of Ofgem, how can 
such a team return to its former colleagues at Ofgem? Secondment of some of the market 
study case team would surely place an intolerable and unreasonable burden on the team 
members and institutions concerned. 
 
The CMA is rightly committed to ensuring that there is no compromise to the need for a 
fresh and independent review in all market investigations. It seems unfortunate that it is a 
co-proposer of what is essentially Ofgem’s competition assessment. In confirming that any 
market investigation group would not be committed to the framework document that has 
 
 
 
22  Market studies and market investigations: Supplemental guidance on the CMA’s approach, CMA3, 
January 2014. 
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been issued in CMA’s name, it would seem important also to confirm that CMA would not 
look to second to its case team any of the Ofgem staff. 
 
11. Apart from that, Mrs Lincoln, are you more likely to engage in the market? 
 
As this article goes to press, Ofgem has described how it will monitor and evaluate the 
impact of its RMR package of remedies.23  The proposals and the associated 72 page 
Scoping Study for an Impact Evaluation, written by its consultants, will appeal to 
connoisseurs of “Bespoke Consumer Research”, “Holistic Context” and “Theories of 
Change (ToC) for each policy measure”, and will keep numerous Ofgem consultants 
gainfully employed for many years to come. My interest here is that the proposed approach 
epitomises the concerns expressed above about Ofgem’s approach to competition 
assessment,  and  has  implications  for  policy  after  the  outcome  of  the  competition 
assessment framework. 
 
Ofgem’s proposed approach “looks at how policies in combination have contributed to 
three broad objectives: building trust, improving understanding and simplifying tariff 
choice”. (p 4) But it does not look at whether customers are better off as a result of these 
policies. Thus, it looks at the impact of Ofgem’s policies on indicators of these three broad 
metrics, but it ignores the initial adverse impact of these policies on the variety of tariffs 
and  range  of  discounts  previously  available  to  different  types  of  customers,  and  the 
possible (arguably inevitable) adverse effects on the prices offered by suppliers. 
 
A page in the Annex does discuss potential unintended consequences. The first two are that 
“tariff prices increase in the short term due to cost of implementation” and “suppliers 
introduce costly systems to become consumer centric, and pass this cost on to the 
consumer”. (p 15) Neither is intended by Ofgem, though of course both are entirely 
predictable. But there is no recognition that the tariff restrictions introduced by Ofgem 
reduce the ability and incentive of suppliers to offer lower prices for various customer 
groups, and thereby lead to higher prices. 
 
Similarly, the last unintended consequence is that “some customers are frustrated at the 
removal of certain tariffs or tariff features (eg certain discounts), and as a result further 
disengage from the market”. (p 15) This wording is interesting in two respects: Ofgem 
does not see the removal of these tariffs and discounts as an economic disadvantage per se, 
simply as a possible “frustration”, and Ofgem’s interest lies not in assessing the extent of 
this disadvantage or frustration but in whether it impacts on the extent of customers’ 
engagement in the market.24 
 
12. Economists and the competition assessment 
 
 
 
23 Domestic Retail Market Review Evaluation – a proposed way forward. Ofgem, 31 January 2014. 
24 A recent example is the growing concern about the withdrawal of tariffs with zero standing charge, 
particularly for gas customers with zero or low consumption. In response, Ofgem has requested information 
as to why this has happened. (Ofgem, Request for information – Standing charge for gas customers with 
zero or low consumption, 20 February 2014) The answer is clear: Ofgem's new policy (maximum four 
tariffs and only one unit charge allowed) makes it impractical and/or unprofitable for suppliers to continue 
to offer tariffs with zero standing charge. But Ofgem does not take responsibility for the predictable 
adverse initial consequences of its policy, focusing only on the hoped-for longer term benefits of greater 
engagement. 
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Ofgem's latest document invites a reassessment of the conclusion at the end of section 10 
of this paper. It is apparent that Ofgem is unable or unwilling to recognise that its policies 
over the last five years – initially on price discrimination and now on tariff simplification – 
are likely to have seriously and adversely restricted and distorted retail competition in the 
energy sector, to the disadvantage of customers. The precise nature and extent of this 
impact, and the extent of any offsetting benefits, need further examination. But why has 
Ofgem  lost  its  way  with  respect  to  competition,  and  who  should  do  the  further 
examination? 
 
Economics is the discipline that seeks to understand competitive markets – and the 
limitations to the scope for intervention therein.25 A significant explanatory factor in the 
evolution of regulatory policy has surely been the gradual –and eventually complete - 
removal of economists from key senior positions at Ofgem and its parent body the Gas 
and Electricity Markets Authority (GEMA). For nearly five years, from its inception in 
January 1999 until September 2003, Ofgem's Chairman/Chief Executive, its Head of 
Markets and one of the Non-Executive Directors were all trained economists. For the 
next four years, from October 2003 to December 2007, both the Head of Markets and one 
Non-Executive Director were economists. But in the six year period since then the 
Chairman, Chief Executive and Head of Markets have none of them been economists, 
and for over half that period no Non-Executive Director was an economist either. The 
situation will change insofar as the new Chief-Executive Designate is an economist, but 
he does not take up position until March, and it will take time for any further changes to 
manifest themselves. 
 
Section 10 concluded that CMA should undertake a market investigation rather than leave 
a competition assessment to Ofgem, and should do so independently of Ofgem staff. This 
was because any such assessment would need to evaluate Ofgem’s own regulatory policy, 
and it would be unreasonable to expect Ofgem staff to do this or even to participate in it. I 
have now regretfully come to the view that there is an even stronger argument for this 
course of action.  Ofgem is not at present capable of carrying out a competition assessment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 "The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they 
imagine they can design." Friedrich A Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, ed W W 
Bartley, University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
